Private equity and workers’ career paths: the role of technological change by Agrawal, Ashwini & Tambe, Prasanna
  
Ashwini Agrawal, Prasanna Tambe 
Private equity and workers’ career paths: 
the role of technological change 
 
Article (Accepted version) 
(Refereed) 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Agrawal, Ashwini and Tambe, Prasanna (2016) Private equity and workers’ career paths: the 
role of technological change. The Review of Financial Studies, 29 (9). pp. 2455-2489. ISSN 
0893-9454 
 
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhw025 
 
© 2016 The Authors 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/69476/ 
 
Available in LSE Research Online: February 2017 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be 
differences between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the 
publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
PRIVATE EQUITY AND WORKERS’ CAREER PATHS: 
THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE  *  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ASHWINI AGRAWAL† PRASANNA TAMBE 
 LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS  STERN SCHOOL OF BUSINESS, 
  NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 
   
 
 
 
 
 
January 7, 2016 
 
Working Paper 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* We are grateful for the comments made by numerous conference discussants, in particular Tim Bresnahan, Morten 
Sorenson, Martin Schmalz, Kasper Nielsen, Paige Ouimet, Yael Hochberg, and Shai Bernstein. We also thank Jim 
Albertus, Sarah Cordell, and Caroline Liao for excellent research assistance. Finally, we acknowledge the helpful 
feedback provided by seminar participants at the University of Illinois, Carnegie Mellon (Tepper), the Cleveland 
Fed, Columbia, Georgetown, MIT (Sloan), NYU, LBS, LSE, the Univ. of Maryland, the Norwegian School of 
Economics, Oklahoma, Rochester (Simon), University of Miami, UBC, UNC, Utah, the CSEF Finance and Labor 
Conference, the UT-Austin Workshop on Social and Business Analytics, the LBS Strategy Conference, the Duke 
Strategy Conference, INFORMS CIST, the International Conference on Information Systems, the USC FOM 
conference, the WFA, and the NBER meetings for Corporate Finance, Labor Studies, and the Economics of 
Information Technology and Digitization. A previous version of this paper was circulated under the title: “Private 
Equity, Technological Investment, and Labor Outcomes”.  
 
† Address for correspondence: London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE. E-mail 
a.agrawal14@lse.ac.uk; Phone Number: +44 020 7955 6875. 
 
                                                          
  
 
PRIVATE EQUITY AND WORKERS’ CAREER PATHS: 
THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
We analyze a new dataset on workers’ career paths to examine whether private equity (PE) 
investments can have positive spillover effects on workers. We study leveraged buyouts in the context 
of recent information technology (IT) diffusion, and find evidence supporting the argument that many 
employees of companies acquired by PE investors gain transferable, IT-complementary human 
capital. Our estimates indicate that these workers experience increases in both long-run employability 
and wages relative to what they would have realized in the absence of PE investment. The findings 
underscore PE’s role in mitigating the effects of workforce skill obsolescence due to technological 
change. 
JEL Codes: G30, G31, J24, M51, M54. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
 A private equity acquisition typically serves as an important catalyst for major changes in 
the trajectory of a firm, but its economic impact on the firm’s employees is poorly understood. 
Many observers have argued that leveraged buyouts (LBOs) cause the employees of an acquired 
firm to experience significant losses in the form of layoffs, wage reductions, and/or changes in 
working conditions (Creswell 2012; Parker 2012). This view likely describes the experiences of 
many workers affected by LBO activity, but may not be a complete description of the effects of 
PE ownership on employees. In particular, studies that document productivity enhancements at 
target corporations suggest that many workers may actually benefit from the spillover effects of 
operational upgrades facilitated by PE ownership (Bernstein et al. 2010; Boucly et al. 2011; 
Davis et al. 2014). 
 To date, however, there has been no direct evidence documenting whether private equity 
investments have spillover effects on the employees of acquired companies, principally because 
of data limitations. In most commonly available data sets, it is difficult to observe information 
about PE investments in acquired companies and observe how these investments relate to the 
long-run career paths of employees. To resolve this issue, we use proprietary data from one of 
the largest online job search websites in the United States to construct a new panel dataset of 
individual worker career paths. The data, based on workers’ employment histories as reported on 
their resumes, allow us to track the long-run career paths of individual workers who are 
employed by PE targets during an acquisition. The employment histories that we study are drawn 
from an underlying sample of over 20 million workers who post on this jobs board; therefore, the 
sample includes a sizable fraction of the U.S. workforce and covers a broad swath of workers 
across many industries and occupations. 
We use these data to test the hypothesis that PE investments in an acquired firm’s 
production methods can produce positive spillovers for many of the firm’s workers. In the 
absence of PE investments, many of these workers may be vulnerable to skill depreciation by 
remaining employed by a firm that uses outdated production methods. We test this hypothesis in 
the context of a particularly significant class of recent operational improvements—those 
associated with the rapid diffusion of information technologies during the recent decade. We 
choose this setting for several reasons: because of its economic significance, because of the rapid 
skill obsolescence faced by workers due to these changes, and also because a well-established 
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 literature provides clear empirical guidance about which types of jobs within the firm should, 
and should not, be affected by these types of investments (Bresnahan et al., 2002; Bartel et al. 
2007, Autor et al. 2003). 
We argue that many employees of PE-acquired firms, and in particular, those employees 
in jobs that have been transformed by computerization, have benefited from exposure to PE-led 
IT investments. A number of studies find that investments in IT have changed the skill 
requirements for jobs, and that the new skills are often transferable across employers (Bresnahan 
et al. 2002; Bartel et al. 2007, Autor and Acemoglu 2010). For example, the introduction of 
computerized numerical control (CNC) machines in manufacturing has prompted many 
production-line workers to become proficient in programming and computer-aided design; these 
skills, over time, have become increasingly valued across a wide variety of industries. We 
hypothesize that LBO-facilitated IT investments induce workers in many jobs to adjust their mix 
of skills, and that the acquisition of these skills has persistent effects on workers’ labor market 
outcomes, even after they separate from their employers. Specifically, we hypothesize that LBO 
workers in jobs where important work activities have been heavily transformed by IT investment 
are more likely to acquire new skills that positively impact their long-run employability and 
wages. 
The ideal experiment for our exercise is to measure the long-run labor market outcomes 
of an individual employed by a target firm at the time of an LBO, and compare these outcomes 
to the counterfactual outcomes that the individual would have realized in the absence of an LBO. 
If the LBO imparts the worker with IT-complementary human capital, we should observe 
differences in these two sets of labor market outcomes. Because the counterfactual is 
unobservable in practice, we use nearest-neighbor matching estimators to identify a worker that 
most closely resembles the LBO employee prior to an acquisition, and we measure her realized 
labor market outcomes to approximate the counterfactual path of the LBO worker. The 
identification assumption is that two workers with matching individual characteristics who 
simultaneously join two firms with matching employer characteristics, prior to an LBO, would 
have had otherwise similar career paths had the LBO never taken place. The estimated difference 
in the subsequent labor market outcomes realized by an LBO individual and a matched control 
individual can therefore be interpreted as the “treatment effect” of the LBO. 
Operationally, we divide our sample of individuals into treatment and control groups 
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 based on the following criteria: if a resume indicates that an individual is currently or was 
previously employed by a firm at the time that it gets acquired in an LBO, we categorize this 
worker as “treated”; otherwise, the worker is part of the control group. For each worker in the 
treatment group, we identify workers from the control group (i.e. the “nearest neighbors”) that 
most closely match the characteristics of the treated worker prior to an LBO. Our choice of 
matching variables is motivated by both the labor economics and corporate finance literatures, to 
control for the individual- and firm-level characteristics that relate PE investments to individual 
labor market outcomes. The detailed nature of our data allows us to control for a number of 
factors that impact individual labor market outcomes, and we use these data to provide evidence 
that supports the identification assumption implicit in our matching strategy.  
Our first finding is that LBOs, particularly those where IT investment is significant after 
an acquisition, are positively associated with the long-run employability of many workers in our 
sample. In both the raw data and in our econometric analysis, we estimate that on an annualized 
basis, employment spells for a typical worker in our sample are 6 to 9 percentage points longer 
after an LBO. The effects that we document include time spent at an LBO firm after an 
acquisition, and are largest for LBOs that occur in years that are often associated with the rapid 
diffusion of IT across industries 
Furthermore, within LBO firms, we observe the largest gains in employability for 
employees who perform jobs that are transformed by IT. In these jobs, tasks such as analyzing 
data and information, making decisions and problem solving, and interacting with computers are 
especially important. The findings support the argument that within occupations, workers at LBO 
targets must acquire skills to perform their jobs in ways that complement new, IT-based 
production methods. In contrast, counterfactual workers who perform the same jobs using older 
production methods do not gain similar skills. Our sample includes LBO workers in a broad set 
of occupations ranging from marketing to manufacturing (not only IT workers), and we are able 
to quantify the extent to which different jobs require IT-complementary skills. Therefore, we are 
able to study the effects of PE investments on workers who perform jobs with the largest scope 
for change due to IT adoption. Our data suggest that it takes these workers 1.3 years on average 
to gain the skills that increase their long-run employability. Presumably, this time reflects 
training and learning-by-doing for LBO employees in jobs that are transformed by 
computerization. 
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 We also find that LBOs are associated with other differences in workers’ long-run career 
paths. For example, workers who perform IT-complementary tasks experience shorter 
unemployment spells immediately after separating from an acquired firm. These workers are also 
more likely to transition to companies that have demand for IT-complementary human capital. 
These transitions appear to be incentivized by wage concerns; our data indicate that LBO 
employees who perform jobs that are transformed by IT earn higher long-run wages. Thus 
overall, these findings further support the view that PE-led IT investments have improved the 
long-run career prospects for many employees of LBO acquired firms. 
We present a number of analyses to discuss alternative explanations for our findings. The 
variation in LBOs that we exploit for our identification is inherently non-random; therefore, there 
are a number of endogenous, unobservable variables that could bias our estimates. Our ability to 
quantify the effects of these variables and thus fully rule out all alternative theories is limited by 
the data that we can observe. However, we are able to exploit the detailed nature of our data to 
qualitatively assess the likely direction and magnitude of biases resulting from these factors.  
For example, if LBO employees have higher unobservable ability than their matched 
non-LBO counterparts prior to a takeover, then our treatment estimates may reflect differences 
in worker quality rather than the acquisition of IT-complementary skills. To assess the likelihood 
of this possibility, we examine the career paths of workers who complete job spells at LBO 
targets in the years prior to an acquisition; if LBO and non-LBO firms historically produce 
workers with different levels of ex-post employability, then one might expect to see divergent 
career paths for workers who exit these firms prior to an acquisition. In contrast to this outcome, 
however, we see no differences in the long-run careers of these workers; this finding suggests 
that our results are unlikely to be driven by worker quality differences alone. 
We then examine whether our findings are fully explained by the endogenous exit of 
workers from target firms after an LBO. For example, PE-appointed managers may selectively 
retain high ability workers, who in turn, use their retention to credibly signal their ability to the 
labor market and thus subsequently realize labor market gains. We argue that this theory is 
unable to explain our full set of findings, as the career effects that we observe are relevant 
primarily for workers in jobs most transformed by IT adoption, rather than all workers who are 
presumably screened and retained by management. Moreover, the individuals that earn higher 
wages after an LBO are the ones who are employed by companies with high demand for IT; 
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 other companies that hire former employees of LBO targets do not pay these workers 
systematically higher wages. 
We also discuss whether high quality LBO employees search for jobs at higher rates and 
are thus more likely to enter our resume sample than high quality non-LBO employees. If such 
differences in sample selection rates are unaccounted for by variables utilized in the matching 
strategy, then these differences might lead to overestimates of our treatment effect. To evaluate 
this concern, we examine the observable characteristics of workers who are employed by LBO 
and non-LBO firms in our sample. The data indicate that the distributions of individual traits are 
very similar across both groups. Moreover, the distributions of worker characteristics for people 
who are employed by LBO firms before versus after an acquisition look very similar. Thus, 
based on observable characteristics, it does not appear that LBOs have a significant impact on 
the types of workers that appear in our sample and are matched between the treatment and 
control groups. 
The collective set of facts support the hypothesis that PE investments can have spillover 
effects on workers. The findings contribute to our understanding of the overall economic impact 
of PE on labor markets. While many observers argue that PE can have deleterious effects on 
workers through layoffs and plant closures, our paper points out that some of the operational 
upgrades engendered by PE investment can have positive effects for many employees. This 
lesson is of particular importance during periods of rapid technological progress. As 
technological advancements render obsolete the business processes used by many firms, 
employees at these companies often face poor long-run employment prospects due to skill 
obsolescence. Our evidence suggests that private equity can serve as a catalyst for introducing 
production upgrades at many such companies, and help workers slow, if not reverse, the costly 
depreciation of human capital that stems from technological change.  
 
II. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS 
Private equity acquisitions are considered by many to have been one of the most salient 
drivers of significant corporate change in the U.S. during the last 30 years. Kaplan and 
Strömberg (2009) estimate that the enterprise value involved in private equity transactions from 
1970 to 2007 totaled more than $3.5 trillion dollars (in 2007 dollars). They note that this value 
was realized primarily during two major waves of private equity activity in the U.S. – the first 
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 one taking place in the 1980’s, and the second one taking place in the 2000’s. Interestingly, 
Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) further document that approximately 40% of this value was 
realized between the years of 2005 and 2007, a period of both unprecedented private equity 
activity, and perhaps not coincidentally, significant information technology investment (Farrell et 
al. 2005; Jorgenson et al. 2007; Tambe and Hitt 2012).  
Debate about the impact of PE on workers, however, remains contentious. Academics, 
policy makers, and union leaders have voiced strong opinions about the perceived effects of 
private equity on workers, with some arguing that PE causes layoffs that are costly to workers 
who face non-trivial transaction costs during unemployment (Agrawal and Matsa 2013). The 
impact of LBOs on workers could be further complicated by the extent to which workers possess 
low levels of transferable skills, as they may have spent many years investing in firm-specific 
human capital (Shleifer and Summers 1988). 
The debate about the impact of PE on workers is divisive, in part, because there is little 
empirical evidence on the topic. The most prominent studies in the area, such as Davis et al. 
(2014), Boucly et al. (2011), and Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990), use net establishment 
employment data and focus primarily on measuring aggregate changes in employment around 
LBOs. In this paper, we use a new dataset of matched employer-employee data constructed from 
resumes to explore whether the operational upgrades associated with PE ownership have 
spillover effects on the career paths of individual workers. We examine this question in the 
context of the IT-related operational upgrades that were prevalent during the second LBO wave. 
We build our hypothesis, about the spillover effects of PE-led IT investments, by appealing to 
various literatures comprised of case studies and large sample analyses.  
First, we note that many papers collectively find that operational upgrades at PE-acquired 
firms are characterized by new work practices. For example, Bloom et al. (2009) and Bernstein 
and Sheen (2013) provide evidence that PE-managed companies improve management practices 
after a buyout. Bacon et al. (2004, 2012) and Wright et al. (2012) show that PE managed firms 
invest in improved human resource management (HRM) practices. Amess et al. (2007) show 
increased levels of discretionary decision making for skilled employees after a buyout, consistent 
with theories of skill biased technological change following PE acquisitions. 
In recent years, many of these operational improvements have been associated with IT 
investment. Matthews et al. (2009) describe a PE firm’s acquisition of a large supermarket chain 
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 in 2007. The PE firm implemented a new data processing system to assist the company with 
inventory management and product pricing. Investing in the new system required “months of 
work and hundreds of man-hours to design and implement.” Though the investment was costly, 
the firm was able to realize significantly higher profits by implementing data-driven pricing 
techniques. In another example, Becker et al. (2011) explains that the health care industry has 
been a frequent target of PE firms, which have made significant efforts to improve data analytics 
to help mitigate medical errors and reduce patient readmission rates at health care facilities. 
Finally, Greeley (2012) describes operational improvements at the Heat Transfer Products Group 
following a buyout by Monomoy Capital. He writes:  
“[The partners] visited hundreds of plants. The better-performing companies consistently used 
some form of the Toyota Production System. The partners began to realize that the traditional private 
equity approach to operations—putting a former CEO on a company’s board—wouldn’t work for some of 
their purchases. “You could have the best CEO in the world,” Hillenbrand says, “but in a manufacturing 
company profits are made on the floor.” 
 
Second, questions about the effects of PE investments in IT on employees are partly 
informed by a literature that finds that IT investments often transform occupations by altering the 
mix of skills they require. Many studies, for example, find that complementarities exist between 
IT investment and the skills such as data analysis, decision-making, and team-based problem 
solving (Bresnahan et al. 2002; Autor et al. 2003; Tambe et al. 2012; Hitt and Brynjolfsson 
1997). Other tasks, such as process control and diagnostic repair, also appear to be intrinsic to 
IT–based production systems (Osterman 1994; Huselid 1995; Macduffie 1995; Bartel 2007). To 
acquire the skills necessary to perform these tasks, workers often require training or learning-by-
doing during production (Bartel et al. 2007). Recent work further shows that the skills required 
by many IT-complementary production processes are task-specific, and thus transferable across 
employers (Autor and Acemoglu 2010).  
In our paper, we tie the lessons learned from these disparate literatures together, and 
hypothesize that LBO employees in jobs being transformed by PE-led IT acquire new skills that 
are transferable across firms. Assuming that the rising demand for such skills across the 
economy is not immediately met by a commensurate, frictionless increase in the supply of these 
skills (an assumption supported by a number of papers on labor market search frictions and skill-
biased technical change (see Acemoglu 2002)), many employees of LBO firms could benefit 
from IT investment spillover effects even after they leave employers acquired through an LBO. 
 9 
 In particular, we predict that workers who acquire these skills will experience greater levels of 
employability, become more likely to transition to companies with demand for IT-
complementary human capital, and will earn higher wages in the long-run. In the Analysis 
section, we develop these predictions in more detail.  
  
III. DATA 
III.A. Sample Construction 
By bringing together three separate data sources, we construct a panel dataset that 
contains time-varying information about individual workers and their employers. In this section, 
we outline the data construction process, provide sample descriptive statistics, and discuss 
important sampling considerations. Because the data construction process itself is extensive, we 
provide an online appendix to this paper that describes key steps of the data construction in 
greater detail.1  
The first source of information comes from an online job website focused on the U.S. 
labor market. The website serves as a platform for two-sided matching between job seekers and 
companies; job seekers post their resumes on the website to look for jobs, while employers 
search through the resumes on the website to identify job candidates.2 Individual job seekers 
voluntarily provide information about their backgrounds and employment histories to the website 
through their resumes and by entering information in various standardized fields. 
The website provided us with the most recent information posted by individual job 
seekers as of 2010. From an individual’s resume, we observe the highest level of education 
attained and the names of past employers. For each position listed on a resume, we also collect 
the position’s job title and description, as well as the position’s start date and end date. From the 
website, we obtain information on the dates when users first post and last update their resumes, 
their employment status as of the time they last update their resume, and the wages they earned 
in their most recent job. We also collect user demographic information such as race and gender. 
There are approximately 23 million workers in our sample, or 13% of the U.S. labor force. The 
vast majority of users post their resumes during the years 2005 to 2010, with employment 
histories dating back primarily to the early 1990’s.  
1 The Appendix also discusses various issues pertaining to data quality as it relates to the analysis. 
2 The data were obtained through a proprietary agreement with the company; as part of the agreement, the company 
name cannot be revealed.  
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 We standardize each employment spell listed on a person’s resume by classifying the 
occupation held by the individual in accordance with the U.S. Department of Labor’s Standard 
Occupational Classification (SOC) system. Using information on job title, job description, and 
worker education, we are able to identify the 6-digit SOC code that most accurately characterizes 
an individual’s job at a particular firm. 3 An observation in our dataset is thus uniquely defined 
by a specific individual holding a specific 6-digit occupation with a unique start and end date. 
 We merge this data with a second source of information: the Department of Labor (DOL) 
and Employment and Training Administration’s (ETA) 2012 survey data on occupational 
requirements. The U.S. DOL/ETA’s Occupational Information Network (O*NET) database 
contains information on the work activities, skills, and tasks required in a given occupation (at 
the 6-digit SOC level). This information is collected from national surveys of each occupation’s 
worker population (randomly selected from the entire population of establishments in the U.S.) 
and occupation experts for those occupations where worker sampling is difficult. For example, 
the O*NET program quantifies the extent to which work activities such as “Analyzing Data or 
Information” and “Making Decisions and Problem Solving” are important for every SOC code 
defined by the DOL. The O*NET database has become a major data source for empirical work in 
labor economics (Jensen and Kletzer (2010), Blinder (2009), and Hallock (2013)). For every 6-
digit SOC code in our resume dataset, we merge the corresponding data from the O*NET 
database on work activities so that we have standardized occupational characteristics for each 
individual employment spell in the resume sample. 
We then merge our linked data of individual employment spells to a third source of 
information: Capital IQ’s database on public and private firm characteristics. For each employer 
associated with a unique employment spell on an individual’s resume, we collect data on the 
employer’s balance sheet and income statements as of the years when an individual is employed 
by the firm.4  We also collect data on whether the company was ever acquired in a leveraged 
buyout during the sample period. Specifically, for each company, we collect information on the 
size of its assets, physical capital stock (plant, property, and equipment (PPE)), operating 
earnings, and 4-digit standard industrial classification (SIC) code. 
3. See www.bls.gov/soc/major_groups.htm for more detailed information on official SOC group descriptions.  
4. Capital IQ maintains name history files that are used to ensure that a given company with multiple name changes 
in the resume database is correctly linked to the same firm identifier in Capital IQ.  
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 The final, merged dataset consists of detailed occupation data and detailed employer data 
for each employment spell for all job seekers who use the website. For computational feasibility, 
we analyze a 10% random sample for this paper. As discussed in the appendix, our results robust 
to the choice of sample size, as we observe similar findings for random 5%, 10%, and 15% 
subsamples of the full data.  
 
III.B. Sample Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents summary statistics describing the individuals in our sample. For 
comparison, we also present the corresponding characteristics for workers in the U.S. labor force 
using data from the 2012 CPS March supplement, BLS statistics, and OES employment surveys. 
The figures in the table indicate that our data cover a wide spectrum of the U.S. work force, as 
online job sites such as our data provider are a major job searching channel (Kuhn and Skuterud 
(2000, 2004)). Not surprisingly, however, there are some important differences between our 
sample and the overall population. Panel A shows that our sample is approximately 52% female; 
the U.S. labor force is approximately 47% female. Panel B illustrates that our sample has a 
similar distribution of education levels across workers, except for those with a college degree, 
who are overrepresented in our sample. The difference in college degree attainment likely 
reflects the fact that college-educated workers are more likely to use Internet job resources than 
are individuals without a high school education (i.e., the remaining workers in the CPS sample).5 
The distribution of employment across industries for our sample is compared to that of 
the U.S. labor force in Panel C. Industry classifications for the employers in our sample are by 
SIC 2-digit major group. The span of industries for workers in our sample closely resembles that 
of the total labor force, as the employers in our sample consist of nearly all public firms as well 
as many of the larger private firms in the U.S. There is oversampling of the finance and business 
sectors in our data relative to the U.S. labor force, and there is undersampling of agriculture, 
construction, and retail trade. Both patterns are to be expected, as the propensity to find 
employment through online resources is likely to be higher in knowledge-intensive industries 
such as finance relative to industries such as agriculture. Moreover, industries that are 
5. Panel C excludes workers who have either less than high school educational attainment or unspecified educational 
attainments; we exclude this group from the current analysis because many of these workers may have incorrectly 
specified their education levels on the website. 
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 undersampled in our data tend to consist of smaller, private firms with relatively fewer 
employees.  
The distribution of occupational employment for our sample is compared to that of the 
U.S. labor force in Panel D. Occupational statistics for the U.S. labor force are obtained from the 
DOL’s 2012 Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) program. To compare the resume-based 
sample with the OES sample, we map the occupational subcategories in the data to the major 
occupational headings as per the DOL’s SOC system (2-digit level). Panel D shows that the 
distribution of occupations in the sample is similar to that of the U.S. labor force. Moreover, the 
large number of observations across occupations illustrates that we observe job histories for 
workers across many categories, ranging from lower ranked employees to higher ranked 
managers. There is some oversampling of management and administrative and clerical positions 
in our data, and there is undersampling of occupations related to food, construction, installation, 
and production services.  
In Panel E, we report the number of weeks that workers are unemployed (for each of the 
years when users upload their resumes). The average number of weeks of unemployment across 
years ranges from 6.2 to 11.1 weeks per year for the sample, and is nearly identical to the time-
series distribution of weeks of unemployment for the labor force. In Panel F, we report that the 
mean and median annual wages earned by users in our sample is $38,000 and $33,000, 
respectively. These figures are very close to the U.S. labor force mean and median incomes in 
2010 of $38,337 and $26,197 (as per the 2011 CPS), respectively.  
Overall, Table 1 illustrates that our dataset contains detailed information about the types 
of job seekers who tend to use online resources to find employment. While the number of such 
workers in this population is significant and covers a large cross-section of the skill distribution, 
as evidenced by the broad similarities in worker attributes between the sample and the labor 
force, there are many workers who are not represented in our data. Therefore, we are able to use 
our data to assess how private equity impacts many, but not all, workers within a firm.  
 
IV. EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK  
IV.A. Identification Strategy 
 To test whether private equity investments in IT can have spillover effects on workers, 
we examine the career paths of individuals in our sample using the nearest neighbor matching 
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 estimator developed by Abadie and Imbens (2006). Our hypothesis predicts that LBO-led IT 
impacts many individual workers at target firms by transforming their work activities and 
incentivizing them to acquire skills to perform these tasks; in turn, the acquisition of these skills 
has a positive effect on workers’ labor market outcomes such as long-run employability and 
wages. The ideal experiment for testing our hypothesis would be to measure the long-run labor 
market outcomes of an individual employed by a target firm at the time of an LBO, and compare 
these outcomes to the counterfactual outcomes that the individual would have realized in the 
absence of an LBO. Because the counterfactual is unobservable in practice, we use the matching 
estimator to identify workers in our sample that closely resemble the LBO employees prior to an 
acquisition, and measure their labor market outcomes to approximate the counterfactual 
outcomes of LBO employees.  
 More specifically, we divide our sample of workers into treatment and control groups 
based on the following criteria: if a person’s resume indicates that the individual is employed by 
a firm at the time that it gets acquired in an LBO (as per Capital IQ), we categorize this worker 
as “treated”; otherwise, the worker is part of the control group. In our sample, matched workers 
may still be currently employed by the same employer at the time of the match (employment 
status after the LBO event is not used as a matching variable). For each worker in the treatment 
group, we identify four workers from the control group (i.e. the “nearest neighbors”) that most 
closely match the characteristics of the treated worker prior to an LBO.6 We match workers 
using a number of characteristics measured at the beginning of a job spell at a given company 
(and hence prior to the LBO transaction for treated individuals).   
 Our choice of covariates is motivated by both the labor economics literature and 
corporate finance literature, as our experiment requires that we control for the individual and 
firm level characteristics that relate PE investments to individual labor market outcomes. We 
match workers based on individual-level characteristics such as education, gender, race, and 2-
digit occupation; employer-level characteristics such as 2-digit industry, operating performance, 
size, and capital intensity; and time characteristics such as the year when a worker starts 
employment at a given firm. The identification assumption is that two workers with matching 
6. The nn-match procedure developed by Abadie and Imbens allows for “ties;” that is, if multiple control 
observations are equidistant from a given treatment observation, all observations are used with the appropriate 
weighting matrix. We choose four matches, following Abadie and Imbens (2006). The results are similar if we vary 
the number of matches.  
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 individual characteristics who simultaneously join two firms with matching employer 
characteristics, prior to an LBO, would have had otherwise similar subsequent career paths had 
the LBO never taken place. 
We look at several labor market outcomes as dependent variables in our analysis. The 
primary outcome that we examine is a worker’s long-run employability, measured by the fraction 
of time that an individual is employed over her observed career, potentially across several firms. 
Specifically, for any given worker starting a job at time t, we define the long-run employment 
duration for the worker at time t to be the ratio of the sum of all K job spell lengths ti starting at 
time t until time t+N, divided by N, where N is the length of time for which the worker’s 
remaining job history is observed and K is the number of jobs held between time t and time t+N. 
For sample workers who never change jobs after time t and remain employed at a firm for the 
entire sample period, the end date for their job is replaced by the date when they last uploaded 
their resume. 
Our measure of long-run employment duration is inherently right censored, as we do not 
observe career paths after the most recent resume update by an individual. However, censoring 
does not adversely impact our analysis because our measure of employment spells can be 
compared across workers with different career lengths, as the measure depicts the fraction of 
time that a given worker is observed in employment relative to the total amount of time observed 
in the labor force.7,8  
 
IV.B. Identification: Strengths and Limitations 
Our estimation strategy has several advantages and disadvantages. One advantage of our 
approach is that the treatment effect estimate is easy to interpret: conditional on the identification 
assumption, it captures the average causal effect of an LBO on the long-run employability of 
individuals in our sample who are LBO employees at the time of a PE acquisition. A second 
advantage of our strategy is that we can ignore unmatched control workers that might otherwise 
skew our treatment effect estimates—without having to specify a selection model of individual 
7 For example, following an LBO in 2002, one treated worker might upload her resume in 2008 (thus providing six 
years of employment history), whereas another treated worker might upload her resume in 2010 (thus providing 
eight years of employment history); we compute the average amount of time that each worker is employed per year 
to facilitate a comparison in mean employment durations. 
8 As a robustness check, we also control for the total length of the observed career path in our specifications to 
ensure that we compare treatment and control workers whom we observe for equal amounts of total time, and we 
verify that our estimates remain unchanged. 
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 assignment into treatment and control groups (Abadie and Imbens (2006), and Imbens and 
Wooldridge (2009)).  
A third advantage of our empirical context is that our data contain a large sample of non-
LBO workers that closely resemble individuals in the treatment group, which supports our 
identification assumption. Consistent with this assertion, Table 2 describes the characteristics of 
workers who are assigned to treatment and control groups as per our empirical strategy. As 
illustrated in the table, the distribution of race, gender, and education of workers in the treatment 
sample mirrors that of the matched control sample. Moreover, the distributions of industry and 
occupational assignment for individuals in both groups are nearly identical. To the extent that 
unobservable worker characteristics are correlated with the many observable characteristics that 
can be measured in our data, the similarities across workers support the identification 
assumption.  
There are two important limitations to our analysis. The first limitation stems from our 
sample coverage. Our data covers a large cross-section of the U.S. labor force, but is not 
representative of the entire population, as there are many workers who are affected by LBOs who 
do not appear in our sample because they do not use the internet for job search. Thus, we are able 
to identify the impact of PE spillovers on many, but not all, workers.  
A second limitation of our approach is that LBOs are non-random events; the validity of 
our identification assumption thus depends on our ability to control for the variables that matter 
for explaining long-run labor market outcomes. There are potentially several unobserved, 
endogenous factors that could bias our estimates, such as the unobserved abilities of workers 
across treatment and control groups, the unobservable investment opportunities that drive PE 
firms to target specific companies and their respective workforces, and the unobservable drivers 
of job search. Although we cannot precisely estimate the effects of these unobservable factors, 
we utilize the detailed nature of our data to assess the likely direction and magnitudes of biases 
that arise as a result of these factors. We discuss this analysis in Section V.C. 
 
IV.C. LBO Characteristics 
As described in section 3, we use Capital IQ to identify individuals in our database who 
have been employed by companies acquired in LBOs during the sample period. Figure 1 depicts 
the yearly number of target firms, along with the total transaction value of the associated 
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 acquisitions, for our sample. Figure 1 also depicts the annual number of LBO targets and total 
transaction values for all U.S. LBOs (population) for comparison. Our data capture 
approximately 35% (4,193 out of 12,143) of all deals that take place in the U.S., which amounts 
to approximately 58% ($261 of $450 billion) of total LBO transaction value during the sample 
period. Our sample coverage compares favorably to other studies in the PE literature; Davis et al. 
(2014) for example, are able to identify LBOs in Census establishment data that account for 69% 
of total LBO transaction value from 2000 to 2005. The firms that are missing from our sample 
correspond to employers who do not have any employees that use our data provider for job 
search. These companies are typically smaller firms with relatively fewer employees, which 
accounts for the discrepancy between the deal number and transaction value population 
percentages represented by our sample.  
Figure 2 illustrates the industry distribution of LBOs in our sample relative to the 
population. The figure shows that the LBOs analyzed in our sample are highly representative of 
the entire population of LBOs that have taken place across various industries, ranging from 
manufacturing to retail trade and service sectors. Taken together with the worker distributions 
depicted in Tables 1 and 2, the data illustrate that our sample covers a broad swath of worker 
types across a heterogeneous set of LBOs.  
We also describe IT investments made at sample firms following an LBO. We use 
measures of IT investment based on prior work that utilizes the same underlying data source as 
this paper (Tambe and Hitt 2012). Specifically, we use our employment history data to measure 
the number of IT employees in our sample who join firms every year from 1990 to 2010. Job 
board users specify whether they consider themselves as being employed in sectors such as IT, 
Sales, Marketing, Manufacturing, etc. on the Web site when they post their resumes. Using job 
start dates from worker resumes, we add up the number of IT workers who join each firm in a 
given year. The idea underlying this IT investment measure is that when firms implement IT-
enabled work practices, they tend to employ significantly more IT labor to facilitate the 
integration of new technologies with the existing operations of the firm (Tambe, Hitt, and 
Brynjolfsson 2012; Tambe and Hitt 2014). IT worker hiring rates are also informative because 
labor commands a larger fraction of the corporate IT budget than physical capital (Saunders 
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 2010) and likely best reflects broader investments into technology-complementary organizational 
transformation (Hall 2002).9,10  
We compare IT investment at buyout targets and non-buyout targets by estimating the 
following linear regression: 
Log IT Flowit = β1(LBO Treatmenti) + β2(LBO Treatmenti x Postit ) + νi + ωt + εit, (1) 
where we define Log IT Flowit as the natural logarithm of the number of IT workers who are 
hired by firm i in year t. We regress this measure on LBO Treatmenti, indicator variable for 
whether firm i is ever acquired in an LBO during the sample period, and LBO Treatmenti x Postit, 
an interaction term in which Postit is an indicator for whether firm i has been acquired by a PE 
group by year t. We also include controls for year and firm fixed effects in other specifications 
(and therefore drop LBO Treatment from the regression). The year fixed effects ensure that we 
control for aggregate changes in IT labor that uniformly impact all firms in the sample, while the 
firm fixed effects control for heterogeneous flows in IT labor due to static differences in firm 
characteristics, such as industry or average size. 
The results are presented in Table 3. Columns 1 and 2 show coefficient estimates for β2 
ranging between 0.038 and 0.068, which indicate that IT labor flows increase by approximately 
3% to 7% following a private equity acquisition. The effects are driven primarily by LBOs 
starting in the year 2000, and especially starting in the year 2003, rather than the LBOs that take 
place in the mid-1990s, as illustrated in columns 3 through 5. For the years 1995 to 2000, the 
coefficient estimate of the treatment effect is economically small and statistically insignificant 
(0.0183), whereas IT flows increase substantially afterward; the coefficient estimates for β2 reach 
up to 0.103.  
The timing of the observed changes in IT labor flows around LBOs indicates that PE 
acquisitions are associated with significant IT investments. These investments likely reflect the 
changes described in the survey evidence and anecdotes discussed in section 2. The data are 
9 Tambe and Hitt (2012) assess the sampling properties of these IT investment measures, and show that IT employment-based 
measures are highly correlated with other IT measures used for earlier sample periods. We do not repeat their analysis in this 
paper for the sake of brevity, but we point readers to Tambe and Hitt (2012) for further details. 
10. Alternative sources of data that have been used to measure IT investment are subject to several known limitations. For 
example, early studies on IT usage by firms used survey data on IT employment and IT capital captured by trade publications 
(Lichtenberg 1995, Brynjolfsson and Hitt 1996), but these data are normally available only for a small sample of firms over a few 
years. A more recent wave of studies uses panel data on IT capital stock acquired from the Harte-Hanks Computer Intelligence 
Technology Database (CITDB) (Bresnahan et al. 2002; Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2003; Forman 2005). This database provides 
information on computer investment, but is subject to significant measurement error, is relevant only for Fortune 1000 firms, and 
most importantly, is unreliable for this type of measurement after 1994 (Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2003). 
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 consistent with the view that private equity firms capitalized on the diffusion of Internet-enabled 
technologies following the boom in e-commerce of the late 1990s (Farrell et al. 2005; Jorgenson 
et al. 2007), creating a setting for many LBO employees to acquire new skills on the job.  
 
V. ANALYSIS 
V.A. Private Equity and Long-run Employability   
 In this section, we present evidence that supports the hypothesis that PE investments 
during our sample period have a positive, causal effect on the long-run employability of workers 
in our sample. Figure 3 compares the measures of long-run employment durations for treated 
versus control workers in the raw data (i.e. without any controls). The average employee of a 
target firm in our sample is employed for 88.1% of a given year (standard error 0.20%). In 
contrast, the average employee of a non-acquired firm is employed for 82.0% of a given year 
(standard error of 0.03%). The difference of 6% across the two groups is statistically significant 
at the 1% level. The raw data alone, therefore, support the argument that the average worker 
from an LBO firm in our sample is subsequently employed for a longer fraction of time during 
her career after an LBO relative to non-LBO workers in our sample.  
 Table 4 presents the nearest neighbor matching estimates for various combinations of 
worker and firm characteristics used to match individuals across the treatment and control 
samples. Under our identification assumption, the estimates can be interpreted as measures of 
how a treated worker fares after an LBO compared to how she would have fared had the LBO 
never taken place. In column 1 of panel A, estimates of long-run employment durations are 8% 
higher for LBO employees in our sample. Intuitively, this estimate indicates that workers of 
acquired firms are employed for 8% longer time each year as a result of an LBO, across 
subsequent job spells at the acquired firm and any subsequent employers. When we match along 
different combinations of firm characteristics to vary the predictors of LBO and non-LBO firm 
assignment, the treatment estimate remains economically large and statistically significant 
(columns 2-4). Similarly, when we match individuals on the length of their most recent 
unemployment spell (an additional control that might capture unobserved worker ability), the 
treatment effect is largely the same. Across all specifications, the annualized difference in long-
run employment duration ranges from 6.0% to 8.2%, mirroring the mean estimates computed 
from the raw data alone.  
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 The estimates are broadly consistent with the view that PE investments can have positive 
spillover effects on a worker’s long-run employability. To shed light on the mechanism that 
explains these findings, we next test sharper predictions of the hypothesis that IT investments are 
a principal driver of these changes. The next section focuses attention on workers who perform 
tasks that are known to have been transformed by information technologies. If workers 
performing these tasks acquire transferable skills that complement PE-led IT investments, they 
should experience changes in their long-run employability.  
 
V.B. Mechanism: IT-Related Production Upgrades 
 As described in Section 2, a large body of labor economics and productivity research 
finds that recent advancements in information technologies have changed the skill requirements 
necessary to complete many jobs. Within our sample, we more closely examine the firms and 
workers that are likely to have been most affected by PE-led IT investment. For LBOs where IT 
investments are a major source of operational upgrades, we would expect to see workers 
benefiting significantly from skill acquisition required by complementary technology 
investments. 
Firm-Level Variation in IT investment. We begin by generating matching estimates, 
similar to those used in Table 4, on subsamples of workers employed by firms that invest heavily 
in IT after an LBO. We split our treatment sample of workers into individuals who are employed 
by firms that experience above versus below mean changes in IT labor hiring rates following an 
LBO. As column 1 of Table 5 indicates, the mean treatment effect of LBOs on long-run 
employment durations is 17.2% for individuals employed at firms with high IT labor hiring rates 
(Panel A), whereas the treatment effect is statistically insignificant and economically smaller 
(7.5%) for individuals at firms with low IT labor hiring rates (Panel B). In column 2, we separate 
workers based on whether they were employed by target firms acquired after versus prior to 
2003, as the years after 2003 were a period of significant information technology diffusion (as 
discussed in Section 2). The treatment estimates show a significant increase in long-run 
employment durations (12.1%) for individuals who are employees of LBO targets during years 
of rapid IT diffusion. 
In column 3, we separately examine workers at firms acquired by PE investors for whom 
IT investments at target operations appear to be a major source of strategic planning. Some PE 
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 firms emphasize operational upgrades as part of their general takeover strategy, while other PE 
firms specialize in financial engineering and other sources of value creation unrelated to target 
operations. We characterize differences in investment strategies empirically by computing 
average IT labor hiring rate changes across target firms for every PE investor in the sample, and 
split the treatment sample by PE firms that exhibit above versus below sample median changes 
in IT labor hiring rates following an average acquisition. Panel A shows higher estimates for 
long-run employment durations for workers associated with deals managed by PE investors that 
have a high propensity to invest in IT following an LBO (9.1%). The estimates on employability 
in panel B, in contrast, for workers associated with PE investors that invest less frequently in IT, 
are insignificant. Across columns 1-3, the estimates in Panels A and B support the argument that 
PE-led IT spillover effects are largest for LBO employees who are most exposed to IT 
developments during the sample period. 
 Worker-Level Variation in IT Complementarity. To introduce greater precision to this 
argument, we examine workers who perform activities that have been most transformed by IT 
investment. IT has required workers in many occupations to acquire new skills. Our hypothesis 
predicts that when we compare two individuals who, prior to an LBO, perform similar jobs, the 
individual employed by an LBO firm investing in IT should experience improved employability 
relative to the individual employed by a non-LBO firm. If IT investments facilitated by PE 
investors serve to simply substitute for workers at LBO targets, then we would not expect LBO 
employees to realize any labor market gains as a result of PE ownership. 
Columns 4-7 of Table 5 examine the impact of LBOs on the employment durations of 
workers who perform work activities that prior research has found to be significantly 
transformed by IT investment. Autor et al. (2003, 2009) and Bartel et al. (2007), for example, 
find evidence that the computerization of many functions has significantly shifted the demand 
for tasks such as analyzing data, problem-solving, and making decisions, and has effectively 
increased the skill requirements for workers performing these tasks. In line with this reasoning, 
Bresnahan et al. (2002), and Black and Lynch (2001) find that IT has increased the demand for 
college level education—ostensibly a proxy for the skills needed to perform tasks that are central 
to IT-based production systems. The impact of LBOs on workers’ employment durations should, 
therefore, be especially pronounced for college-educated workers in jobs where IT-
complementary tasks are important. 
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 To test these predictions, we utilize data from the O*Net Survey of Work Activities to 
identify the extent to which various activities are expected of a worker within a particular 
occupation (at the 6-digit SOC level). The DOL assigns numerical scores corresponding to the 
relative importance of each activity within each occupation. For example, managers who 
principally coordinate work (SOC codes 11–1010) have high scores for “Guiding, directing, and 
motivating subordinates,” whereas motor vehicle operators (SOC codes 53–3000) have low 
scores for this activity. See the Appendix for more detail on these measures. 
We classify the work activities “Analyzing Data”, “Decision making and problem 
solving”, and “Interacting with Computers” as being IT-complementary (Autor et al. (2003, 
2009), Bartel et al. (2007), Bresnahan et al. (2002), and Black and Lynch (2001)). Workers in 
occupations with above-median scores for the importance of these work activities should have 
the greatest scope for changes in subsequent employment durations because these work activities 
are particularly impacted by IT improvements. 
 Consistent with these predictions, columns 4-6 of Table 5 indicate that the treatment 
effect estimates for employment duration for workers who are required to analyze data, make 
decisions and solve problems, and interact with computers are economically large and significant 
(ranging from 0.092 to 0.140). The comparable estimates for workers for whom such activities 
are of little importance (Panel B) are not statistically significant.11 Column 7 indicates that the 
largest estimates of our employability measure are for college-educated workers. These findings 
support the view that workers in jobs requiring new skills to perform activities transformed by IT 
show the largest improvements in employability. 
Time required to acquire human capital. We use our data to estimate the amount of time 
that workers require to pick up IT-complementary skills following an LBO. We hypothesize that 
workers who remain at a target firm for longer durations are better able to acquire human capital, 
through job training and learning-by-doing, than workers who separate from their employer soon 
after an acquisition. We identify treated workers who leave their employer during the sample 
period, and group them into quartiles based on the length of time elapsed between the LBO event 
date and the date when they leave the firm. The first quartile contains workers who remain at the 
11. In addition to distinguishing workers based on sample median task scores, we find that our results are robust to 
alternative measures of task importance, such as sample mean and top tercile scores. We also examine other types of 
non-routine tasks that could be classified as complementary to new IT work practices (as per Autor et al. ([2003]), 
such as “Thinking Creatively”, and find similar results that are consistent with our hypothesis.  
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 firm for 0 to 0.5 years; the second quartile is for workers who stay for 0.5 to 1.3 years; the third 
quartile is for workers who stay for 1.3 to 2.5 years; and the fourth quartile is for workers who 
stay more than 2.5 years at the acquired firm following an LBO.  
Table 6 and Figure 4 illustrate that workers who exit the firm in the first two quartiles do 
not have significantly different employment durations than similar workers who exit comparable 
firms. The workers who experience significantly longer employment durations over their careers 
following an LBO are the individuals who remain at the acquired firm for 1.3 years or more: the 
treatment effect estimate for these workers ranges between 0.119 and 0.126. The results suggest 
that workers in jobs transformed by IT investment require about 1.3 years to gain the skills 
necessary to realize improvements in employability.  
Unemployment Duration after an LBO. To describe the temporal dynamics of the 
increased employability realized by LBO workers, we examine the length of unemployment 
spells immediately experienced by those workers who separate from their employer following an 
LBO. Specifically, we define Post unemployment duration as the length of time between the end 
date of a given job title and the start date of the next job title listed on the worker’s resume, 
where observed. For each separated worker in the treatment sample, we use the nearest-neighbor 
matching algorithm to identify four observations from the control sample that most closely 
match the pre-LBO characteristics of the treated worker, and we estimate the mean difference in 
unemployment durations for the workers across the treatment and control groups. 
Table 7 presents the treatment estimates for various combinations of worker and firm 
characteristics used to match individuals across both samples. Panel A contains results for the 
full treatment sample, while Panel B contains results for the treatment sample split by quartiles 
of time spent at the target firm following an LBO (as per Table 6). Column 1 of Panel A contains 
the baseline specification and shows that the average worker leaving an acquired firm 
experiences an unemployment spell that is approximately 2.9 months (0.243 years) shorter than 
the average spell realized by a matched control worker. Columns 2–5 indicate similar estimates, 
illustrating the robustness of the effect to the choice of matching specification. For workers who 
leave acquired firms prior to an LBO, the lengths of subsequent unemployment durations are 
slightly longer than matched control sample workers (column 6). This result shows that workers 
from target firms do not historically experience shorter unemployment durations after exit.  
Panel B dissects the results in Panel A by time quartile of exit after an LBO. The first 
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 three columns show statistically insignificant (or at most, weakly significant) effects of the LBO 
treatment on unemployment durations for workers who exit LBO firms within 1.3 years. Column 
4, in contrast, shows that workers who stay longest at the LBO firm have the shortest subsequent 
unemployment durations. Although subsequent unemployment spells (not just the immediate 
spell after an LBO) also factor into the long-run employment duration measures studied in Table 
3, the results in Table 7 illustrate that the increases in long-run employability that result from 
LBOs are not simply artifacts of longer spells within LBO firms.  
Employer Transitions. Our hypothesis predicts that LBO workers who acquire IT-
complementary skills should be more likely to transition to companies that have demand for 
these skills. To characterize the nature of employer transitions in the data, we estimate the 
following logit specification: 
IT Employerijkt = β1(LBOijt) + β2(Worker Characteristicsijt) + β3(Firm Characteristicskt) + εijkt, 
where the subscripts ijkt denote person i moving from firm j to firm k after being employed by 
firm j at time t. The dependent variable is an indicator for whether firm k’s IT labor hiring rate in 
year t is above the 2-digit industry median firm’s hiring rate in year t; a firm’s IT labor hiring 
rate is defined as the ratio of a firm’s IT labor inflow to the total number of its employees. The 
key explanatory variable is LBOijt, an indicator variable for whether firm j is acquired in an LBO 
while person i is an employee. We include a number of control variables describing worker 
characteristics: binary indicators for race, gender, education, 2-digit occupation, and the year that 
the worker joins the firm. We also include firm characteristics such as the return on assets, firm 
size (log assets), capital intensity. Standard errors are clustered at the industry and year level, to 
account for correlations in the unobserved worker-level attributes that influence employment 
transitions to a given industry in a particular year.  
 We use industry-adjusted IT labor flows to proxy for demand for IT-complementary 
skills; we assume that a firm that hires above its industry median level of IT labor has greater 
relative demand for IT complementary human capital than firms with below-median levels of IT 
labor hiring rates (Tambe and Hitt 2012). If workers acquire transferable skills that complement 
new information technologies following an LBO, then these workers should exhibit a higher 
likelihood of transition to firms that have demand for their skills.  
The coefficient estimates for our logit specification, reported in odds ratios, are presented 
in Table 8. The odd-numbered columns contain only the LBO treatment as an explanatory 
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 variable, while the even-numbered columns also include the full set of controls. Columns 1 and 2 
report results for the full sample. In both specifications, the coefficients are positive and 
statistically significant, which is consistent with the argument that workers of PE-acquired firms 
are on average much more likely to transition to companies that have above-median industry 
demand for IT complementary skills. Specifically, without controls, the estimates in column 1 
suggest that the odds of a transition to a firm with above-median demand for IT-complementary 
skills are approximately 17.9% higher for an individual employed by an acquired firm than for a 
similar individual employed at a non-acquired firm. The estimates in column 2 suggest that the 
estimated effect is even stronger (57.1%) when we control for worker and firm characteristics.  
In columns 3 and 4 (5 and 6), we limit the treatment sample to those workers who hold 
occupations in which activities such as “Decision making and problem solving” (“Analyzing 
Data and Information”) have above-industry median levels of importance as per U.S. DOL 
classifications. Workers who perform activities that are central to IT-enabled production should 
be more likely to acquire skills that enable them to transition to firms that have demand for IT-
complementary skills. Consistent with this conjecture, estimates of the likelihood that employees 
transition to firms with demand for IT-complementary skills, reported in columns 3 through 6, 
are higher for employees who make decisions, solve problems, and process information at LBO 
targets, relative to similar workers at non-acquired firms (the estimated odds increase from 23% 
to 119% across all columns). 
Long-run wages. Our PE investment spillover hypothesis predicts that LBO workers who 
perform jobs that have been transformed by PE-led IT during the sample period will acquire 
transferable human capital. An implication of this hypothesis is that as IT diffuses throughout the 
economy, the acquisition of this human capital should be associated with a positive effect on 
wages.  
We test this implication by examining long-run wages reported by individuals in our 
sample. We compare the wages most recently earned by employees of LBO firms with the wages 
reported by employees of non-LBO firms, by running the following regression: 
Log(Wageit )= β1(LBO Treatmentit) + β2(LBO Treatmentit*IT Taskit) + β3(IT Taskit) + νi + ωt + εit, 
where Wageit corresponds to the most recent annual wage earned by person i in year t, LBO 
treatment is an indicator for whether person i has been employed by an LBO target at any time 
up till time t, and IT Taskit is the O*NET score of the work activity importance associated with 
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 the occupation held by the worker. We also include variables describing person i at time t: binary 
indicators for race, gender, education, and 2-digit industry of employment. The time 
characteristics include indicators of the year for which the wage of person i corresponds.12  
The interaction term in the specification can be interpreted as the impact of LBOs on the 
wages of workers who perform jobs that have been transformed by IT. Table 9 reports results 
across specifications based on the tasks analyzed in Table 5 (each panel corresponds to a specific 
task, such as “Analyzing Data and Information”). The column 1 wage estimates in each panel are 
larger for workers in the sample who perform jobs with higher scores for IT-complementarity, 
consistent with aforementioned papers on skill-biased technical change. The wage estimates in 
column 2 are higher still for those workers who perform these tasks and had worked previously 
at an LBO firm during the sample period. Across all panels, the estimates suggest a wage 
premium for these workers that ranges from 2.5-3.5% for each additional unit of IT-
complementary activity score. The difference in the LBO coefficient estimate between columns 
1 and 2 suggests that the link between LBOs and worker wages is heterogeneous across LBO 
employees. In our sample, it appears that the only LBO workers who realize a wage premium are 
the ones in jobs that are being transformed by IT.  
When we split our treatment sample into workers who transition to firms with high vs. 
low levels of IT stock, we see some evidence for further disparity of wage premia across 
workers. The wage premia earned by LBO workers who perform tasks transformed by IT is 
realized mainly by individuals who work for companies that have high levels of IT stock; the 
coefficient for the interaction term is positive and significant in column 3, but not in column 4 
for Panels A and B. Companies with low levels of IT stock, which presumably have lower 
demand for IT-complementary work activities within jobs, do not offer a wage premium to 
similar workers. These figures suggest that workers who acquire IT-complementary human 
capital, and who are employed by companies that have demand for these skills, earn higher 
wages. 
Collectively, the estimates support the hypothesis that LBOs have a positive impact on 
the long-run earnings of workers who acquire the skills necessary to be productive in IT-enabled 
12 We do not use a matching framework to analyze wages because we only observe one wage per person 
in our sample and thus cannot use prior wage data to match workers. To compensate for this limitation, 
we use a regression framework, as this enables us to incorporate commonly used controls for prior wages.  
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 work contexts. LBOs do not appear to impact the wages of workers who do not perform such 
jobs in our sample. The data are consistent with the view that LBOs, during the recent decade of 
IT adoption, are associated with wage premiums for those workers whose jobs have been most 
transformed by IT-enabled work practices at PE-owned firms. 
 
V.C. Alternative Explanations and Endogeneity Analysis 
In this section, we discuss alternative explanations for the findings. The variation in 
LBOs that we exploit for identification is inherently non-random, so our empirical analysis is 
subject to some of the same endogeneity concerns that are endemic to the PE literature. We 
cannot precisely estimate the effects of unobservable variables that might be missing from our 
econometric specifications. Therefore, it is difficult for us to test and completely rule out all 
alternative theories. However, we are able to exploit the detailed nature of our data to examine 
related corollaries of these theories, and thus qualitatively assess the likely direction and 
magnitude of biases resulting from various unobservable factors. 
1. Endogenous, ex-ante differences between LBO and non-LBO workers 
 One alternative explanation for our findings is that LBO and non-LBO firms historically 
employ different types of employees. These differences may result from the ex-ante sorting 
process by which firms and workers match prior to an LBO. For example, PE firms may target 
companies with higher-than-average quality workforces in order to generate high investment 
returns. If the matching variables do not sufficiently capture worker quality, these quality 
differences could explain the observed differences in worker labor market outcomes.  
 To consider this possibility, we repeat our analysis in Panel A of Table 4 and empirically 
examine the career paths of workers who complete employment spells at LBO targets prior to a 
PE acquisition and examine their labor market outcomes relative to matched control sample 
workers. If LBO and non-LBO firms historically produce workers with different levels of ex-
post employability—even in the absence of an LBO— then one might expect to see divergent 
career paths for workers who exit these firms prior to an acquisition.  
In contrast to this outcome, however, panel B of Table 4 illustrates that there are no 
significant differences in our estimates for workers who leave LBO firms prior to an acquisition. 
Across all specifications, the treatment estimates for this sample are economically small and 
statistically insignificant. The findings suggest that the observed differences in long-run 
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 employability of workers employed at the time of the LBO (panel A) are not explained by 
systematic differences in the types of workers who join LBO targets versus non-LBO targets.  
2. Endogenous, ex-post differences between LBO and non-LBO workers 
 Another alternative explanation for the findings centers around the endogenous exit of 
workers from LBO and non-LBO companies, after the LBO takes place. For example, PE-
appointed managers may selectively retain workers of high ability, who in turn credibly signal 
their ability to subsequent employers by remaining at the LBO target for long durations. 
Alternatively, PE firms may shut down various divisions of a newly acquired company, leading 
to mass layoffs. Workers who leave non-acquired establishments for idiosyncratic reasons could 
be inferred to be of lower average quality than workers who are laid off from LBO targets 
(Waldman 1984; Gibbons and Katz 1991).  
This explanation is unlikely to fully account for our findings, for several reasons. First, if 
PE firms simply screen workers for ability, then presumably all retained LBO employees should 
realize higher wages, irrespective of their task and employer characteristics. In our data however, 
the only individuals that earn higher wages after an LBO are the ones who perform tasks that are 
transformed by IT and who are employed by companies with high demand for IT-skills. 
Additionally, the evidence we document is driven by LBOs that have high levels of IT 
investment following an acquisition—not LBOs with little IT expenditure. Second, if mass 
layoffs cause the average quality of workers exiting LBO firms to be of higher quality than non-
LBO workers, then we should likely observe positive treatment estimates for workers who 
separate from their employers soon after an acquisition. The findings in Table 6 and Figure 4, 
however, reject this hypothesis.  
3. Sample Selection 
We also consider whether high quality LBO employees search for jobs at higher rates and 
are thus more likely to enter our resume sample than high quality non-LBO employees. If such 
differences in sample selection rates are unaccounted for by variables utilized in the matching 
strategy, then these differences might lead to overestimates of our treatment effect. To evaluate 
this concern, we examine the observable characteristics of workers who are employed by LBO 
and non-LBO firms in our sample.  
Table 2 shows that the distributions of observable characteristics of workers in our 
treatment and control samples are nearly identical. Moreover, Table 2 also shows that these 
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 distributions mirror that of workers who complete employment spells at LBO firms prior to an 
acquisition. The similarities in the genders, races, educations, and occupations of individuals 
across these groups suggest that the LBO event per se does not differentially impact the types of 
workers that we observe in the treatment and control samples. To the extent that unobservable 
worker quality is correlated with these observable characteristics, it appears unlikely that worker 
quality would be systematically different across these groups of individuals. 
 To further explore selection bias, we utilize our data on the employment status of job 
seekers at the time that they last update their resume. If LBOs cause workers to utilize the job 
search site at rates that depend on their employment status (and thus implicitly, their ability) after 
an acquisition, then our treatment estimates might be biased. We assess this possibility by 
performing our matching strategy in Table 4 with added controls for employment status as of the 
last resume update. Even after adding this control, however, we find that our treatment estimates 
remain the same. 
  
VI. CONCLUSION 
 We construct and analyze a novel employer-employee matched dataset to empirically 
measure the impact of PE investment spillovers on workers, in the context of the rapid IT 
advancements that characterized much of the last decade. Following an LBO during the sample 
period, we estimate that workers from target firms who acquire IT-complementary skills realize 
increases in long-run employability and wages relative to what they would have realized in the 
absence of PE investments. The findings suggest that private equity may benefit the employment 
prospects of workers who are otherwise limited by their exposure to outdated production 
methods. The results inform our understanding of the impact of PE on workers, by showing that 
some workers benefit from PE investments in ways that are typically ignored in policy debates.  
Our work points to other avenues for potential research. In particular, we believe that it is 
important to assess the extent to which private equity, more broadly, plays a role in influencing 
the diffusion of new production technologies across firms. It is unknown whether private equity 
serves as a catalyst for target firms to be leaders or laggards in technological adoption within a 
given industry. Additionally, it would be interesting to understand the value implications of such 
changes, to help further resolve debate surrounding the broader impact of private equity in the 
economy.  
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 FIGURE 1 
POPULATION AND SAMPLE DISTRIBUTIONS OF LEVERAGED BUYOUTS 
The top bar chart depicts the number of target firms that appear as employers in our sample, compared to the 
population of target firms. The vertical axis depicts the number of target firms. The bottom bar chart depicts the total 
transaction value of the deals involving sample employers, compared to the population. The vertical axis depicts 
total transaction value, in $MM. The horizontal axis in both charts depicts the transaction years.  
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 FIGURE 2 
POPULATION AND SAMPLE DISTRIBUTION OF LEVERAGED BUYOUTS ACROSS 
INDUSTRIES 
This histogram depicts the frequency of leveraged buyouts across 2-digit SIC major industry groups for the entire 
population and for our resume sample. Population data comes from Capital IQ. The horizontal axis depicts the 
industry major group name, the vertical axis depicts the percentage of the total represented by a particular industry 
(by number of deals). For each industry group, the column on the left corresponds to the population, while the 
column on the right corresponds to the resume sample.  
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 FIGURE 3  
LONG-RUN EMPLOYMENT DURATION CONSTRUCTION AND COMPARISON 
This figure depicts the construction of our measure of long-run employment duration and presents descriptive 
statistics summarizing our measure for workers in the treatment and control samples. For any given worker starting 
a job at time t, we define the long-run employment duration for the worker to be the ratio of the sum of all K job 
spell lengths ti starting at time t until time t+N, divided by N, where N is the length of time for which the worker’s 
remaining job history is observed and K is the number of jobs held between time t and time t+N. 
 
   
Employment Duration = 
∑ 𝑡𝑖
𝐾
𝑖=1
𝑁
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FIGURE 4  
DIFFERENCES IN LONG-RUN EMPLOYMENT DURATION FOR LBO VERSUS 
NON-LBO WORKERS 
This figure depicts the differences in long-run employment durations (annualized) for workers in the treatment 
sample (LBO workers) versus workers in the matched control sample (non-LBO workers). For all workers in the 
treatment sample, we compute the distribution of the time elapsed between the LBO effective date and the date of 
job exit (or last recorded date of employment if still employed at the target firm). Treated workers are then sorted on 
the quartile of elapsed time to which they belong. The first quartile sample contains workers who remain at the firm 
for 0 to 0.5 years; the second quartile is for workers who stay for 0.5 to 1.3 years; the third quartile is for workers 
who stay for 1.3 to 2.5 years; and the fourth quartile is for workers who stay more than 2.5 years at the acquired 
firm. The solid line represents the matching estimates computed for each quartile sample, and the dashed lines 
represent the 95% confidence intervals around the estimates.  
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 TABLE 1  
SAMPLE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
This table presents summary statistics describing the full sample, and for comparison, the characteristics of the U.S. labor force (from the BLS CPS and OES). % 
Sample and % Labor Force refer to the percentage of individuals in the sample and U.S. labor force, respectively. Industry classifications are based on 2-digit 
SIC major groups, while Occupation classifications are based on 2-digit SOC major groups. Industry and occupation designations for a sample worker refer to 
the most recent job title held by the worker for which data is available. Unemployment Durations are average number of weeks per year that workers are not 
working, while annual wages are self-reported earnings for the most recent job held by an individual. Total is the number of individuals in the sample. 
Category % Sample % Labor  Force Category % Sample 
% Labor 
Force  Sample 
Labor  
Force 
         
Panel A: Gender   Panel D: Occupation   Panel E: Unemployment Durations 
Female 52 47 Management 15.8 4.9 2005 6.16 6.15 
Male 48 53 Business 6.1 4.9 2006 6.42 5.98 
   Computer 5.2 2.7 2007 6.67 6.27 
Panel B: Education   Engineering 1.6 1.8 2008 7.97 8.55 
4-year college 33 21 Life Sciences 1.3 0.8 2009 9.59 11.18 
High School 27 27 Social Services 1.4 1.4 2010 11.14 10.66 
2-year 20 19 Legal 1.0 0.8    
Graduate degree 10 8 Education 3.8 6.4 Panel F: Annual Wages 
Vocational 9 10 Arts 1.7 1.3 Mean $38,000 $38,337 
Doctorate 1 2 Healthcare 2.3 5.9 Median $33,000 $26,197 
   Health Support 2.1 3.0    
Panel C: Industry   Protective Service 1.3 2.5    
Agriculture 0.3 1.6 Food 3.2 8.9 Total 202,114  
Mining 0.8 0.5 Maintenance 0.7 3.3    
Construction 2.7 5.7 Personal Care 1.3 2.9    
Manufacturing 18.1 15.8 Sales 12.6 10.6    
Transportation 7.6 5.8 Administrative 28.4 16.4    
Wholesale Trade 5.4 6.0 Construction 1.9 3.8    
Retail Trade 17.8 20.0 Installation 1.2 3.9    
Finance 15.3 6.4 Production 3.0 6.6    
Services 31.4 32.3       
Public Administration 0.7 6.0       
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 TABLE 2  
TREATMENT VERSUS CONTROL SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS  
This table presents summary statistics describing individuals in the treatment, control, and prior-LBO sample. The treatment sample consists of individuals who 
have been employed by a company at the time that it gets acquired in a leveraged buyout. The control sample consists of all other workers in the sample. The 
prior-LBO sample consists of individuals who have been employed by an LBO target but separate from their employer prior to the leveraged buyout. % 
Treatment , % Control, % Prior-LBO refer to the percentage of individuals in the treatment, control, and prior-LBO samples, respectively. Industry classifications 
are based on 2-digit SIC major groups, while Occupation classifications are based on 2-digit SOC major groups. Industry and occupation designations for a 
sample worker refer to the most recent job title held by the worker for which data is available.  
 
Category % Treatment % Control % Prior-LBO Category % Treatment % Control % Prior-LBO 
        
Panel A: Gender    Panel D: Occupation    
Female 51 52 52 Management 19.2 15.7 16.3 
Male 49 48 48 Business 6.3 6.1 4.8 
    Computer 6.4 5.1 5.2 
Panel B: Education    Engineering 1.9 1.6 1.2 
4-year college 34 33 33 Life Sciences 1.0 1.3 1.0 
High School 30 27 30 Social Services 0.9 1.4 0.8 
2-year 20 20 22 Legal 0.7 1.0 0.6 
Graduate degree 10 9 8 Education 2.5 3.9 2.3 
Vocational 5 9 7 Arts 1.7 1.7 1.42 
Doctorate 1 1 0 Healthcare 1.5 2.4 1.05 
    Health Support 1.5 2.1 1.6 
Panel C: Industry    Protective Service 1.4 1.3 1.0 
Agriculture 0.3 0.3 0.3 Food 3.7 3.2 4.3 
Mining 0.4 0.8 0.6 Maintenance 0.6 0.7 0.7 
Construction 1.8 2.8 1.8 Personal Care 1.2 1.3 1.2 
Manufacturing 21.4 18.0 18.9 Sales 14.6 12.6 13.5 
Transportation 7.4 7.6 7.4 Administrative 24.9 28.5 32.9 
Wholesale Trade 6.4 5.3 6.1 Construction 1.7 2.0 1.8 
Retail Trade 22.9 17.6 24.5 Installation 1.3 1.1 1.2 
Finance 10.7 15.4 12.0 Production 3.1 3.0 3.2 
Services 28.2 31.5 27.4     
Public Administration 0.5 0.7 0.5 No. of observations 5,680 196,434 4,846 
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 TABLE 3  
LEVERAGED BUYOUTS AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENT 
This table reports OLS regression estimates describing IT investment around LBO events. The dependent variable is 
the natural log of the quantity of incoming IT workers at a firm in a given year. The explanatory variables include a 
binary indicator (post-LBO) for whether the firm has been previously acquired through an LBO in a given year, a 
binary indicator of whether the firm was ever an LBO target during the sample period (LBO target) , and year and 
firm fixed-effects. Columns 1 through 5 present estimates for different subsets of sample years (the full sample is 
presented in column 1). Standard errors are reported in italics underneath the coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** 
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 
Panel B: IT Hiring Sample years: 
 1995–2010 1995–2010 1995–2000 2000–2010 2003–2010 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Post-LBO 0.068* 
0.035 
0.038** 
0.016 
0.018 
0.053 
0.062** 
0.020 
0.103** 
0.026 
LBO target  0.031 
0.030 
    
      
Year fixed effects x x x x x 
Firm fixed effects  x x x x 
      
No. of obs. 143,360 143,360 46,362 107,342 76,718 
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 TABLE 4 
IMPACT OF LEVERAGED BUYOUTS ON WORKER LONG-RUN EMPLOYABILITY  
This table reports the matching estimates of the differences in long-run employment durations (annualized) for 
treated LBO workers and matched non-LBO control workers. Panel A presents estimates of the treatment effect for 
LBO workers employed by an acquired firm at the time of the LBO transaction (treatment sample A). Panel B 
presents estimates of the treatment effect for workers who have employment spells at LBO target firms prior to an 
acquisition (treatment sample B). The control sample for both panels consists of matched non-LBO workers. LBO is 
defined as a binary indicator for whether the individual is in the treatment or control group. Across all specifications, 
workers are matched on individual person and firm characteristics: indicator variables for race, gender, education, 
occupation (2-digit SOC code), and industry (2-digit SIC code), the starting year of the position held at a given firm, 
years of labor market experience up until the starting year, and the total number of years of observed employment 
history. For each treatment observation, four matches from the control sample are identified (with replacement, 
allowing for ties). Exact matching is imposed on the year in which an individual begins serving a particular job title. 
Where indicated, additional variables used to match treatment and control observations include firm characteristics, 
such as Assets (defined as the book value of firm assets), Return on Assets (defined as the ratio of operating earnings 
to assets), Capital Intensity (defined as the ratio of net plant, property, and equipment to assets), and person 
characteristics such as Unemployment Duration (defined as the length of an individual’s unemployment spell 
immediately prior to a given position). Standard errors are reported in italics underneath the coefficient estimates. *, 
**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Panel A: Workers who are employed by an acquired firm during an LBO  
LBO  0.080*** 0.060** 0.060** 0.066** 0.082** 
 0.024 0.06 0.026 0.027 0.032 
      
No. of obs. 34,003 28,209 28,204 27,523 19,207 
      
Panel B: Workers who leave an acquired firm prior to an LBO  
LBO  -0.001 0.008 0.007 0.002 0.016 
 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.019 
      
No. of obs. 31,686 26,245 26,240 25,602 17,740 
      
Add’l match 
variables:  
     
   Assets x  x x x 
   Return on assets  x x x x 
   Capital intensity    x x 
   Unempl. duration      x 
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 TABLE 5  
IMPACT OF LEVERAGED BUYOUTS ON WORKER EMPLOYABILITY BY CROSS-SECTIONAL EXPOSURE TO INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
This table reports the matching estimates of the differences in long-run employment durations (annualized) for treated LBO workers and matched non-LBO 
control workers, across samples of workers facing differing exposures to IT transformation. Panel A presents estimates of the treatment effect for LBO workers 
employed by an acquired firm at the time of the LBO transaction (treatment sample A). Panel B presents estimates of the treatment effect for workers who have 
employment spells at LBO target firms prior to an acquisition (treatment sample B). The control sample for both panels consists of matched non-LBO workers. 
LBO is defined as a binary indicator for whether the individual is in the treatment or control group. Across all specifications, workers are matched on individual 
person and firm characteristics: indicator variables for race, gender, education, occupation (2-digit SOC code), and industry (2-digit SIC code), the starting year 
of the position held at a given firm, years of labor market experience up until the starting year, the total number of years of observed employment history, the 
length of an individual’s unemployment spell immediately prior to the matched position, and firm assets, return on assets, and capital intensity. For each 
treatment observation, four matches from the control sample are identified (with replacement, allowing for ties). Exact matching is imposed on the year in which 
an individual begins serving a particular job title. Panel A (B) presents estimates of the treatment effect for workers who have strong (weak) exposure to IT 
investment, as per the following variables: IT worker hiring rates is defined as an indicator for whether a treated individual is employed at a firm that experiences 
an above (panel A) versus below (panel B) average industry-adjusted changes in annual IT hiring rates following an LBO. Buyout occurs after 2003 corresponds 
to an indicator of whether an LBO takes place after January 1, 2003 (A). PE firms with IT focus corresponds to an indicator for whether the PE firm that acquires 
a target company exhibits above PE-industry median investment in IT. Task categories for columns 6–8 correspond to U.S. Dept. of Labor survey scores for 
work activities that have been significantly transformed by IT (across 6-digit SOC codes). IT-complementary tasks refer to workers with above (A) versus below 
(B) median scores for Analyzing Data and Information, Making Decisions and Problem Solving, and Interacting with Computers. Standard errors are reported in 
italics. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 Firm:  IT Complementary Tasks: Skills: 
 
IT worker hiring 
rates 
Buyout occurs 
after 2003 
 
PE firms with IT 
focus 
Analyzing Data 
and Information 
Decision making 
& problem 
solving 
Interacting with 
Computers College education 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Panel A: Strong exposure to IT      
LBO 0.172*** 0.121*** 0.091*** 0.140*** 0.117*** 0.092*** 0.120*** 
 0.052 0.046 0.034 0.048 0.041 0.039 0.038 
        
No. of obs 19,018 19,108 19,193 19,059 19,101 19,105 19,135 
        
Panel B: Weak exposure to IT      
LBO 0.075 0.048 -0.045 0.015 0.017 0.036 0.062 
 0.049 0.038 0.069 0.039 0.044 0.047 0.061 
        
No. of obs 19,070 19,041 18,954 19,116 19,074 19,070 19,014 
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 TABLE 6  
IMPACT OF LEVERAGED BUYOUTS ON EMPLOYABILITY BY TIME-SERIES EXPOSURE TO IT 
This table reports the matching estimates of the differences in long-run employment durations (annualized) for 
treated LBO workers who separate from their employer after an LBO and matched non-LBO control workers. The 
treatment sample is split into quartiles, based on the length of time that a treated worker is employed at an acquired 
firm following an LBO. The control sample consists of matched non-LBO workers. LBO is defined as a binary 
indicator for whether the individual is in the treatment or control group. Across all specifications, workers are 
matched on individual person and firm characteristics: indicator variables for race, gender, education, occupation (2-
digit SOC code), and industry (2-digit SIC code), the starting year of the position held at a given firm, years of labor 
market experience up until the starting year, the total number of years of observed employment history, the length of 
an individual’s unemployment spell immediately prior to the matched position, and firm assets, return on assets, and 
capital intensity. For each treatment observation, four matches from the control sample are identified (with 
replacement, allowing for ties). Exact matching is imposed on the year in which an individual begins serving a 
particular job title. Standard errors are reported in italics underneath the coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
  
 Time quartile: 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
LBO 0.040 0.043 0.119** 0.126** 
 0.084 0.066 0.052 0.055 
     
No. of obs. 19,003 19,021 19,001 19,008 
     
Time between LBO and exit 0–6 months 6–16 months  16–30 months >30 months 
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 TABLE 7  
IMPACT OF LEVERAGED BUYOUTS ON WORKER UNEMPLOYMENT SPELL LENGTH  
This table reports the mean differences in the duration of unemployment (in years) for spells that take place 
immediately after an individual holds a job at a specific company, for treated workers exiting LBO firms after an 
acquisition, and matched non-LBO workers. Panel A contains results for the full treatment sample; Panel B contains 
results for the full sample split across quartiles of time spent at an acquired firm following an LBO. LBO is defined 
as a binary indicator for whether an individual is in the treatment or control group. LBO (Prior) is defined as a 
binary indicator for whether an individual holds a position and leaves her employer before her employer is acquired 
in an LBO. Across all specifications, workers are matched on individual person and firm characteristics: indicator 
variables for race, gender, education, occupation (2-digit SOC code), and industry (2-digit SIC code), the starting 
year of the position held at a given firm, years of labor market experience up until the starting year, and the total 
number of years of observed employment history. In Panel A, the specifications also include the following 
characteristics where indicated: the length of an individual’s unemployment spell immediately prior to the matched 
position, firm assets, return on assets, and capital intensity. In Panel B, the full specification is analyzed. For each 
treatment observation, four matches from the control sample are identified (with replacement, allowing for ties). 
Exact matching is imposed on the year in which an individual begins serving a particular job title. Standard errors 
are reported in italics underneath the coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
  
 
Panel A: Full Sample (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
LBO  -0.243*** -0.209*** -0.205*** -0.201*** -0.201***  
 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.058  
LBO (prior)      0.070 
      0.053 
       
No. of obs. 24,120 20,319 20,317 19,820 12,510 11,483 
       
Match variables:        
   Assets x x x x x x 
   Return on assets  x x x x x 
   Capital intensity   x  x x 
   Prior duration    x x x 
 
Panel B: Split Sample Time quartile: 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
LBO  -0.052 -0.193* -0.138 -0.374** 
 0.087 0.107 0.177 0.168 
     
No. of obs. 12,383 12,400 12,383 12,391 
     
Time between LBO and exit 0–6 months 6–16 months  16–30 months >30 months 
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 TABLE 8  
IMPACT OF LEVERAGED BUYOUTS ON WORKER TRANSITIONS ACROSS COMPANIES 
This table reports logit estimates of the impact of LBOs on workers’ employment transitions across companies. The dependent variable is a binary indicator of 
whether an individual transitions to a firm that exhibits above-median industry (2-digit SIC) IT-worker hiring rates. LBO is defined as a binary indicator for 
whether an individual is part of the treatment or control group. Where indicated, the other independent variables include controls for person, firm, and time 
characteristics: indicator variables for race, gender, education, 2-digit SOC occupation, log years of labor market experience, log of firm assets, return on assets, 
capital intensity, and indicators for the starting year of each person at the source firm. Treatment sample refers to the sample of treatment workers included in 
each specification. The treatment sample in columns 1 and 2 includes all workers employed by firms at the time of an LBO, the treatment sample in columns 3 
and 4 (5 and 6) only includes workers at LBO targets in occupations in which IT-transformed tasks such as “Decision making and problem solving” (“Analyzing 
Data”) have above-median levels of importance as per U.S. DOL classifications. Coefficients are reported as odds ratios. Standard errors are reported in italics 
underneath the coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 Treatment Sample: 
 All workers Decision making & problem solving Analyzing Data 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
LBO 1.179** 1.571** 1.234** 1.958** 1.314*** 2.191*** 
 0.081 0.372 0.109 0.598 0.109 0.843 
       
No. of obs 151,216 8,242 151,001 8,212 151,029 8,216 
       
Controls:       
   Experience  x  x  x 
   Race  x  x  x 
   Gender  x  x  x 
   Education  x  x  x 
   Occupation  x  x  x 
   Firm Size   x  x  x 
   Profitability  x  x  x 
   Capital Intensity  x  x  x 
   Unemployment   x  x  x 
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 TABLE 9 
IMPACT OF LEVERAGED BUYOUTS ON LONG-RUN WAGES 
This table reports regression estimates of describing the relationship between LBOs, IT-complementary tasks, and 
workers’ long-run wages. Worker wages are self-reported earnings for the most recent job listed on an individual’s 
resume. IT Task is the U.S. DOL O*NET occupational score for IT complementary tasks performed by the 
individual: Analyzing Data and Information (Panel A), Making Decisions and Problem Solving (Panel B), 
Interacting with Computers (Panel C). LBO is defined as a binary indicator of whether an individual ever worked for 
a firm that gets acquired in an LBO, and LBO×IT is an interaction term of LBO and the IT task score. Control 
variables in all columns include the following characteristics: indicator variables for individual race, gender, 
education, and industry (2-digit SIC code), year fixed effects for the last year of the job for which the earnings 
correspond, and the log of the years of labor market experience up until the wage reporting year. Treatment Sample 
denotes the types of firms for which wages are included in the specification for treated individuals: All, High, and 
Low IT Firms, where High and Low refers to above and below treatment sample median IT employment levels as a 
fraction of total firm employment. Number of obs. denotes number of observations in each column. Standard errors 
are reported in italics. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A:Analyzing Data and Information 
IT Task × LBO  0.025** 0.130** 0.045 
  0.011 0.055 0.028 
IT Task 0.161*** 0.160*** 0.159*** 0.159*** 
 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
LBO 0.080*** -0.002 -0.381** -0.060 
 0.010 0.036 0.189 0.093 
Panel B: Making Decisions and Problem Solving 
IT Task × LBO  0.034*** 0.114** 0.051 
  0.012 0.052 0.032 
IT Task 0.185*** 0.184*** 0.184*** 0.184*** 
 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
LBO 0.074*** -0.065 -0.392 -0.125 
 0.010 0.049 0.257 0.126 
Panel C: Computer Interaction 
IT Task × LBO  0.026** -0.005 0.044 
  0.012 0.047 0.038 
IT Task 0.085*** 0.083*** 0.083*** 0.083*** 
 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
LBO 0.089*** 0.003 0.057 -0.050 
 0.002 0.040 0.164 0.123 
Treatment Sample All All High IT Firms Low IT Firms 
Number of Obs. 39,489 39,489 38,098 38,214 
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